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Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

AUG 21 1953

DATE:

AUG 21 1953

TO : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

FROM : Chief, AB

SUBJECT: GENERAL - REDSK/AERODYNAMIC

SPECIFIC - Contact and Briefing CASSOWARY 2 Prior to European Trip.

RE: Attachment "A", under separate cover.

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Participants: CASSOWARY 2,

CASSOWARY 15,

1. With the arrival of the meeting was launched on a discussion of a study submitted by CASSOWARY 2 for KUGOMI consideration. The paper was noted by as being entirely too long, not fulfilling a specific purpose, too broad in scope, confusing, and having a decided lack of forcefulness. It would have been better, stated, had the effort been limited to the CHINPORK psychological warfare problem.

CASSOWARY 2 replied that the paper was not his, but had been given to him by an individual, from the Eastern part of the CHINPORK territory, who was a product of the Soviet regime. CASSOWARY 2 felt that this work should be interesting in that it would afford some insight into the Soviet mentality. He further stated that he purposely did not want to correct the paper, feeling that it would destroy some of its effectiveness.

2. From the paper, the discussion then moved to the Foreign Policy of Identity A. Here noted to CASSOWARY 2 that "a great deal can be done on non-pre-determination and self-determination." He added that although Identity A cannot recognize any USSR states, with the exception of the Baltic areas, in its overt policy, it could offer positive aid in the covert field. cited the covert cooperation with CASSOWARY 1

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RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICER

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Removed from Project Aerodynamics
CS Classification: 74-124-29/3
JOB # 69-425/83

Box: 20 Fold: 7

FORM NO. 51-20
JUN 1949

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as encouragement to the CAMPAGNE cause. Overtly, he added, the CAMPAGNE cause was abetted by such moves in Identity A as the effort to establish diplomatic relations with the recognized Soviet Republics. However, []

[] added, in the event of open conflict, support would be given to CAMPAGNE and its liberation effort.

At this point in the discussion, CASSOWARY 15, who had been acting as a part-time interpreter for CASSOWARY 2, interjected that "your support has been mostly technical." He then asked for a clarification of the term "political support consistent to Identity A policy" which [] had used. [] answered that if the people "inside" wanted a free country, Identity A would support it. However, he said that should the CAMPAGNE area erupt in a revolution "tomorrow," Identity A support must be based upon such considerations as:

- A. How long can the revolution endure?
- B. How much support can Identity A give without provoking a global conflict?
- C. The legal status of the uprising.

CASSOWARY 15 then asked why ODACID objected to such legislation as House Concurrent Resolution 58 which implied a free Ukraine. To this [] answered the principle of self-determination would no longer be operative. [] [] added that should Identity A recognize the incumbent Ukrainian government, it would be adding ammunition to Soviet propaganda. Identity A, in recognizing the Ukrainian SSR, would place CASSOWARY 1 in an awkward position, reducing it to the level of a dissident renegade group. This degradation would not serve in the best interest of CASSOWARY 2 and his organization. [] again re-emphasized that ODACID policy permitted self-determination if the people wanted it.

CASSOWARY 2 acknowledged Identity A support to CAMPAGNE and noted that it did show Identity A sympathy for the Ukrainian struggle and its liberation aims. However, he added, "We don't have a guarantee that in the future the principle of self-determination will be correctly applied."

In the matter of the mandate received from CAMPAGNE, [] stated that this recognition was fine as far as CASSOWARY 2's position within the Ukrainian emigration was concerned. He said, however, that the mandate did not apply to Identity A. [] felt that some tangible supporting material of an intelligence nature would enhance the prestige of CASSOWARY 1 in the eyes of Identity A. CASSOWARY 2 agreed to this. He stated that CAMPAGNE had had some unfortunate experiences during World War II with German promises and as a result was very reluctant in engaging in extensive intelligence activities..

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[] countered, stating that he was thinking in terms of CASSOWARY 2. He advised that GAWNPORC should support CASSOWARY 2, noting specifically that he, CASSOWARY 2, was in official contact with Identity A. He asked CASSOWARY 2 to ignore the cries of the misinformed emigre pseudo-politicos who reasoned that because such controversial Ukrainian emigres as GULAI, BOHARTIRCHUK, DOLENKO, and Taras SULIBA-BOROVETS were granted audiences with ODAVID and ODEARL, this did not constitute a carte blanche recognition of these factions.

CASSOWARY 2 said he understood the covert relationship, but felt that on the other hand the overt relationship was not aiding the Ukrainian cause; if anything, he added, it was doing it harm. He added that the official stand taken by EG CANOE was inconsistent on the self-determination principle as discussed the previous year. AE ACTIVE was brought in as another example of the deviation in the self-determination principle by noting that the group was Great Russian dominated.

[] reiterated his previous statement on the private nature of AE ACTIVE and unofficial Identity A interest in that organization. He reflected that he had looked over AE ACTIVE's political efforts in Germany and remarked that it was characterized by the lack of accomplishments. He added, "There is nothing that Identity A can do but advise ... In the final analysis, if you (CASSOWARY 2) can produce more, and confidence is built up in you, your position with Identity A will be undisputed. You are in contact with GAWNPORC."

CASSOWARY 2 said it was in the best interest of CASSOWARY 1 and Identity A to keep GAWNPORC alive. It was necessary to do everything possible on both sides in order to insure moral and material assistance and not weaken the will to fight by use of material from SPLINGO and EG CANOE which is contrary to what is propagandized by GAWNPORC. He asked Identity A to "come to a clear position -- either support the Liberation Movement ... (or) keep to the preservation of FJSTEL."

[] admitted that he did not know, but stated that when the present administration took office it announced a policy of liberation. He noted that Identity A was in an awkward position and that only "time and place" would decide the support to be given. [] used as an example the recent East German riots, in which it would have been very inopportune for Identity A to offer overt aid for an uprising. As for the Ukrainian situation, should a revolt be fermented tomorrow, [] said, Identity A could not send tanks, but it could increase courier traffic into the Ukraine with supplies. It is therefore imperative, he continued, that more strategic intelligence be transmitted from GAWNPORC. "We know of the contact, but it has not shown any positive results."

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
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In recapitulation, [] said he wished to explore the stand of Identity A to determine the status of the Ukraine vis-a-vis the USSR satellites. The position of the Ukraine was uncertain, while the satellites are sure of support and recognition. Then returning to AB ACTIVE, CASSOWARY 2 asked, "Are the machinations of private committees reflecting Identity A's attitude?"

He agreed with [] on the intelligence aspects of the operation, and said he would write to CANNPORE. The text of the letter would tell CANNPORE to supply specific intelligence as per our needs. When this intelligence is received, CASSOWARY 2 said he would then check the attitude of Identity A. However, he said that it was imperative that CANNPORE does not over-extend its capabilities and jeopardize the safety of the people inside. He felt that the reluctant position adopted by CANNPORE in gathering intelligence against specific targets was brought about by (a) difficult, untenable military situations, i.e., oblavas; and (b) misinformation about the present situation at home and abroad disseminated by JAVELIN.

CASSOWARY 2 felt that the next set of messages from CANNPORE would clarify the internal situation.

In order to establish the bona fides of the CASSOWARY 1 mandate, CASSOWARY 2 asked the Case Officers concerned to intercede in his behalf with JAVELIN. As for CAVATINA 1, CASSOWARY 2 felt that he would have some difficulty in convincing the CAVATINA leader to honor the CASSOWARY 1 mandate, but felt sure that he would win the support of many CAVATINA 1 followers.



MR:gc(17 August 1953)

Distribution:

- 3 - COM, w/att under separate cover
- 2 - CSOB, w/att under separate cover
- 1 - RI, w/att (retained in SR/3 file)
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Attachment "A"

Identity A: That which pertains to the United States Government.

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